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Antitrust law and patent law have long been considered in tension. On a very
simplistic level, antitrust law was seen as anti-monopoly, whereas ―[t]he very object of
[the patent laws] is monopoly.‖1 Antitrust law condemns exclusionary conduct and patent
law grants exclusionary rights. These exclusionary rights are seen as the price of
rewarding—and thus encouraging—innovation. But a reward that restrains competition
seems at odds with antitrust‘s goal of removing trade restraints from the marketplace.
Consequently, courts historically have discussed the ―conflict between the patent laws on
the one hand, which encourage monopoly power by granting patent holders the right to
exclude and be free from competition, and the antitrust laws, on the other hand, which
generally proscribe monopoly and encourage competition.‖ 2
* Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. The author thanks Christina Bohannan,
Chris Cotropia, Herb Hovenkamp, Tony Reese, and participants in the Journal of Corporation Law symposium.
1. E. Bement & Sons v. Nat‘l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 91 (1902).
2. Int‘l Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 792 F.2d 416, 426 (4th Cir. 1986); see also United States v.
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that the patent ―grant is in inevitable

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2062428

Leslie Ready For CEC

1260

Do Not Delete

The Journal of Corporation Law

6/29/2009

[Vol. 34:4

In response to this saga of laws in tension, courts and commentators began to argue
that antitrust and patent law were more properly viewed as complementary, because
―both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.‖ 3 In their recent
report on antitrust, IP, and innovation, the antitrust enforcement agencies argued that:
[A]ntitrust and intellectual property are properly perceived as complementary
bodies of law that work together to bring innovation to consumers: antitrust
laws protect robust competition in the marketplace, while intellectual property
laws protect the ability to earn a return on the investments necessary to
innovate. Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to enter the
marketplace with a desirable technology, product, or service. 4
So antitrust and patent law both try to stimulate innovation: the former by stimulating
competition, and the latter by temporarily suppressing it.5
We have two conceptions of the relationship between antitrust and patent: in tension
or complementary. In reality, both conceptions have an element of truth, but antitrust and
patent are neither always in tension nor always complementary. Rather, the relationship is
multidimensional. Antitrust law and patent law are in tension in some contexts,
particularly in the short run. For example, a patent holder can exclude infringing
competitors from the market, even if the competitors can make the product more
efficiently. In the long run, after the patent expires, consumers can purchase the
innovation in a competitive marketplace.
The relationship between antitrust law and patent law involves a series of trade-offs:
How much should competition be suppressed in the short run in order to encourage
innovation in the long run? Are there instances and industries where intellectual property
rights are unnecessarily expansive, such that competition is suppressed more than needed
to incentivize innovation? These trade-offs between antitrust and patent take place in the
context of broader innovation policy.
Instead of thinking about patent policy versus antitrust policy, we should be
discussing an innovation policy that has two constituent parts: IP and competition law. IP
law may be a cornerstone of innovation policy, but the patent system—as currently
constructed—cannot maximize innovation without the assistance of a strong antitrust
regime. Antitrust and patents are not merely complementary in that they pursue the goal
of innovation; instead, they affirmatively depend on each other. Both are necessary;
neither is sufficient. They are components of an overall innovation policy that maximizes
both static and dynamic competition.
Part I of this Article reviews the role of patent law in innovation policy. This is not
particularly controversial. Part II argues that antitrust law, too, is an important part of
American innovation policy. When the other elements of a violation are established,
tension with the general hostility against monopoly expressed in the antitrust laws‖).
3. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM‘N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 2 (2007); see also U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE &
FED. TRADE COMM‘N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995)
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/0558.pdf [hereinafter LICENSING GUIDELINES] (―The intellectual property
laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer
welfare.‖).
5. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
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antitrust law condemns agreements, conduct, and mergers that reduce innovation. Part III
argues that patent law and antitrust law should operate in tandem to condemn and deter
several forms of innovation-stifling activity. Judges too often operate as if, when patent
law proscribes particular conduct, an antitrust remedy is unnecessary and no antitrust
violation has been committed. Part III explains how patent and antitrust remedies operate
differently, and that when particular conduct violates both areas of law, both patent and
antitrust penalties should be imposed. Finally, Part IV discusses the relative advantages
of patent and antitrust law when both condemn the same misconduct and argues that
antitrust should play a greater role than it currently does.
I. PATENT POLICY AS INNOVATION POLICY
Patent law is largely a response to the fact that many inventions, once made, are
relatively easy to appropriate. Unlike a physical object, the taking of an inventor‘s idea
can happen quickly and without the owner‘s awareness. If the inventions of innovators
were too easily copied and commercialized by others, then truly creative people would
have significantly less incentive to invest their time, resources, and intellect into
developing new products and processes. Innovation would suffer. Patent law attempts to
solve this problem by granting exclusionary rights to inventors. By ensuring that the
creator receives the monetary rewards attendant to innovation, the patent system
encourages the research and development necessary for dynamic efficiency.
This raises the issue of how much patent protection is necessary to spur innovation.
For example, if the duration of patents were too limited, inventors might not be able to
charge a supracompetitive price long enough to recoup their research costs and earn a
sufficient profit to make their efforts worthwhile. Similarly, if the bundle of exclusionary
rights were somehow inadequate, the value of patents would decrease and diminish the
rewards to inventors. In short, weak patent protection reduces the incentive to research
and innovate.
While it is easy to see how insufficient rewards may hurt innovation, less obvious is
the fact that overly strong patent protection also hurts innovation. Innovation is a
cumulative process in which today‘s inventors build on the ideas of yesterday‘s creators.6
The Supreme Court has explained that the patent system ―promotes disclosure of
inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public to practice the
invention once the patent expires.‖7 If patent duration were too long, inventors would be
less able to expand and improve upon the ideas of the prior generation. In the context of a
copyright case, Judge Kozinski noted:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.
Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. . . .
....
Intellectual property rights aren‘t free: They‘re imposed at the expense of
future creators and of the public at large. . . .
6. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991) (noting the need to ―investigate the use of patent protection and
cooperative agreements among firms to protect incentives for cumulative research‖).
7. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
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This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances between
what‘s set aside for the owner and what‘s left in the public domain for the rest
of us.8
Judge Kozinski‘s reasoning applies both to patents and copyrights—a diminished
public domain damages the environment in which innovation takes place. Professor
Hovenkamp has explained that ―too much [IP] protection can produce costly monopolies
or exclusive rights that others must either license or innovate around.‖ 9 This increases the
costs of market entry and innovation, ultimately hurting both static and dynamic
efficiency.
Given the harms associated with both under- and over-protection of patent rights,
patent law attempts to strike a balance by rewarding innovation through exclusionary
rights, without unduly stifling innovation by granting an overly expansive bundle of such
rights. Patent law tries to create the proper balance in a number of ways. First, the law
limits patentable subject matter. Applicants cannot acquire patents on the ―laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,‖10 or on ―a novel and useful mathematical
formula,‖11 or on ―the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals.‖ 12 Justice
Breyer explained the rationale for these exclusions:
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that ―laws of
nature‖ are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that they are not useful.
To the contrary, research into such matters may be costly and time-consuming;
monetary incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that
research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for
the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather
than ―promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,‖ the constitutional
objective of patent and copyright protection. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only encourage research
by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their presence can
discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example
by forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading
them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending
patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs
of using the patented information, sometimes prohibitively so.
Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it
seeks to avoid the diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can
threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between these opposing and
risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and discovery

8. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 626 (6th
Cir. 2000) (adopting Judge Kozinski‘s position).
9. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 249 (2005).
10. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
11. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
12. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
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within the scope of patentability while excluding others. 13
Because an overly expansive view of patentable material could lead to rent-seeking
behavior and ―enormous transaction costs‖ on later users and inventors, patent law strikes
a balance between under- and over-protection by limiting what types of inventions can be
patented.14
Second, patent law has developed litigation defenses to strike a balance between the
need to reward current innovators and the risk of stifling later innovators. Patent doctrines
such as inequitable conduct and patent misuse provide defenses against infringement
claims by patentees who have either acquired or employed their patent rights in an
improper manner. These doctrines and their relationship to antitrust law are discussed in
Part III.
In its quest to maximize innovation, the patent system tries to achieve the proper
balance between under- and over-protection. But this balancing does not occur solely
within the patent system. Patent law intersects with other areas of law—most notably,
antitrust. Much of the history of innovation policy in twentieth-century America can be
viewed through the lens of the changing relationship between antitrust law and patent
law. As Professor Hovenkamp explained:
[D]uring the 1930s and 1940s the Supreme Court was hostile toward patents,
construing them as narrowly as possible, often invalidating them, and
exaggerating their potential for competitive harm. Today, after three decades of
expansion we have probably reached the opposite extreme. IP protection has
gradually been ratcheted up, with broader coverage and longer terms.15
Achieving the proper balance between these two areas of law is necessary to achieve the
optimal overall innovation policy. The following Part argues that antitrust law is also an
important component of innovation policy.
II. ANTITRUST POLICY AS INNOVATION POLICY
Antitrust plays an underappreciated role in the American innovation regime. Indeed,
some people apparently view antitrust as an impediment to innovation because antitrust
limits what patent holders may do in search of maximizing the returns on their patents.16
Because patent law rewards and encourages innovation while antitrust acts as a
constraint, the fear exists that antitrust is somehow anti-innovation. But antitrust policy is
not in contravention or contraposition to innovation policy. Antitrust law is a
fundamental component of innovation policy.
Much of the innovation in the American marketplace comes from the existence of a
competitive marketplace.17 Antitrust law is often necessary to ensure the presence of that
13. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from dismissal of certiorari).
14. Id. at 127.
15. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 250.
16. See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Competition Perspectives on Patent Law Substance and Procedure: An
Overview of the FTC/DOJ Hearings and the FTC Report, 18 ANTITRUST 34, 35–36 (2004) (noting testimony at
FTC/DOJ Hearings).
17. The non-competitive markets of the communist era were not known for their influx of innovative
products.
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competition. The antitrust enforcement agencies have opined that ―antitrust laws promote
innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting certain actions that may harm
competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.‖ 18 Part III
of this Article will develop this argument more fully by exploring the interplay between
antitrust and patent law. For now, three broad explanations of how antitrust facilitates
innovation should suffice.
First, section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements that unreasonably restrain
trade.19 While antitrust cases and commentary more often focus on agreements to fix
price or quantity, section 1 also precludes agreements to suppress innovation. For
example, competitors may agree not to improve their products because quality
competition could disrupt a stable oligopoly, tacit or explicit. Firms may prefer to spend
their profits on perks, not research. Alternatively, influential firms in a standard-setting
organization may attempt to manipulate the standard in order to exclude more innovative
products from competing in the market. 20 Finally, another way that section 1 encourages
innovation is by condemning group boycotts against patentees or price-fixing by
licensees.21 Absent antitrust, buyers (and licensees) may collude to reduce the payment to
inventors. These forms of collusion reduce the incentive to invent by artificially
suppressing the market value of patented innovations.
Second, section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns monopolies acquired or maintained
through anticompetitive conduct. 22 Section 2 implicates innovation policy in at least two
ways. First, antitrust law can facilitate innovation by encouraging competitive markets
and discouraging monopolized ones. Much economic literature debates whether a
relatively competitive market or a monopolized market better encourages research and
innovation. Joseph Schumpeter argued that monopolies are more likely to innovate
because they can secure monopoly profits and invest them into research. 23 Furthermore,
in accordance with this view, it is the desire for monopoly profits that encourages firms to
innovate.24 Although his theory is influential, researchers have ―found ‗little empirical

18. LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 2.
19. 15 U.S.C § 1 (2000); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
20. See, e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 508–09 (1988) (holding
that the National Fire Protection Association was subject to antitrust liability for excluding an innovative type of
electrical conduit from its book of product standards with the intent to benefit makers of traditional electrical
conduit).
21. See, e.g., Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D. Conn. 2001);
Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 235, 237 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (stating that ―[c]oncerted refusals to buy
are no less a violation of the antitrust law than concerted refusals to sell‖), aff’d, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1966).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
23. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing JOSEPH A.
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–90 (Harper Perennial 1976) (1942)) (discussing
the nature of markets subject to rapid technological change); KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC
THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 19–20 (2003) (―The prospect of earning large, temporary profits
generates efforts to innovate.‖).
24. See Verizon Commc‘ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (―The
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at
least for a short period—is what attracts ‗business acumen‘ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth.‖); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 57 (―Moreover, because innovation can increase an
already dominant market share and further delay the emergence of competition, even monopolists have reason
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support‘ for Schumpeter‘s hypothesis that large firm size or high concentration is
strongly associated with a higher level of innovative activity.‖ 25
Antitrust judges and enforcement officials have taken a decidedly nonSchumpeterian approach. In his famous Alcoa opinion, Judge Learned Hand observed
that one of the economic and social costs of monopoly was sloth. 26 Weighing the
competing views, the Supreme Court long ago reasoned that ―the advantages of
competition in opening rewards to management, in encouraging initiative, in giving labor
in each industry an opportunity to choose employment conditions and consumers a
selection of product and price, have been considered to overbalance the disadvantages.‖27
More recently, Anne K. Bingaman, the head of the Department of Justice‘s (DOJ)
Antitrust Division during the Clinton Administration, argued that:
[i]n a world driven by rapid changes in technology, empirical evidence
indicates that the firms that prosper are far more likely to be those that face
fierce rivalry in their home markets than the sheltered monopolists. In a very
real sense, the fear of being left behind is more likely to spur innovation than
the security bred of stable market power.28
In sum, competition is conducive to innovation. Competitive markets spur
innovation, while illegal monopolies try to quash it because innovation would undermine
their ability to receive monopoly profits. 29 Some commentators remain unpersuaded by
both sides of the Schumpeterian debate.30 But to the extent that monopolists are less
likely to innovate than firms in competitive markets, antitrust‘s condemnation of certain
monopolies—those acquired through anticompetitive conduct—serves to increase overall
innovation in the marketplace.31
Second, specific anticompetitive conduct may also be anti-innovation. Monopolists
may try to inhibit innovation because innovators topple monopolists. The Microsoft case
illustrates this point. Microsoft possessed monopoly power in the market for Intelto invest in R&D.‖).
25. Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 951, 984 (2008).
26. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting that ―possession
of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity
from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone‖).
27. United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 (1948).
28. Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Att‘y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Remarks at the
University of Kansas Law School: Competition and Innovation: Bedrock of the American Economy (Sept. 19,
1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/0877.htm; see also Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary
Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 43 (2004) (noting
that ―unless firms are hopelessly disconnected from the real world, the pipe dream of ‗monopoly‘ can hardly be
the major incentive that drives most firms to innovate‖).
29. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 13 (2008) (―Moreover, several studies
suggest that a moderate degree of competition might actually spur innovation.‖).
30. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 495, 512 (1999) (―As a matter of economic theory, it is impossible to say for certain
whether enforcement of the antitrust prohibition against monopolization, which might restrict the conduct of a
dominant firm, will on balance enhance or reduce aggregate industry innovation in general.‖).
31. It bears noting that if the monopolist could maintain its market position through innovation, it would
not be an illegal monopoly. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979)
(citations omitted).
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compatible PC operating systems. 32 It enjoyed a 95% market share and was protected
against competition by the applications barriers to entry.33 Microsoft‘s monopoly
position seemed secure.
Microsoft, however, faced a long-term threat from middleware, including browsers
and Sun‘s Java technology. The evolution of technologies could allow software
developers to write their applications for a browser or in a language that any operating
system could read. If either one of these technologies proved successful, software
developers would not have to write programs exclusively for Microsoft‘s operating
system; consumers could purchase any operating system, yet still be able to use an
abundance of applications that were not operating system-specific. With the applications
barrier to entry eroded, Microsoft‘s monopoly over operating systems would be in
jeopardy.
In order to diminish this threat, Microsoft strove to prevent innovation in
middleware. It did so through a series of moves designed to displace Netscape‘s
Navigator web browser with Microsoft‘s Internet Explorer. 34 Microsoft had no designs
on earning a profit in the browser market; it merely wanted to control the market so that it
could keep the technology from evolving in a manner that would undermine the
applications barrier to entry. Microsoft imposed licensing terms on original equipment
manufacturers designed to keep Netscape‘s Navigator off PC screens. 35 It integrated
Windows and Internet Explorer so that consumers could not rid their computers of
Internet Explorer without disabling their operating systems. 36 Microsoft also entered into
a series of agreements with internet access providers, internet content providers,
independent software venders, and Apple to disadvantage Netscape. 37 Despite being
found liable for antitrust violations by a federal district court, on appeal Microsoft
presented no business justifications for most of its anticompetitive conduct. 38
Because Sun Microsystem‘s Java Virtual Machine could also eliminate the
applications barrier to entry, Microsoft sought to undermine this technology as well.
Microsoft purchased a license from Sun, but then, in breach of this contract, Microsoft
designed its own version of Java that was incompatible with the one developed by Sun. 39
Microsoft then deceived software application developers into thinking that the systems
were compatible.40 While software developers thought they were writing programs that
could run on any operating system, in reality, the programs only worked on Microsoft‘s.
One internal document presented at trial stated Microsoft‘s strategy: ―Kill cross-platform
Java by grow[ing] the polluted Java market.‖ 41 Finally, Microsoft coerced Intel to stop
aiding Sun in improving the Java technologies. 42
A unanimous en banc D.C. Circuit opinion found Microsoft liable for illegally
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 59–74.
Id. at 59–64.
Id. at 64–67.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 67–74.
See, e.g., id. at 66–67.
Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 76–77.
Id. at 76–77.
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 77–78.
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monopolizing the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems. The case stands for
the proposition that section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns predatory conduct whereby a
monopolist maintains its market power by stifling innovators.43
Third, antitrust law also encourages innovation through merger policy. Merger law
treats innovation as an important output of the American antitrust regime. When the
antitrust agencies review a merger to determine whether it is likely to substantially lessen
competition, in addition to considering the merger‘s likely effects on market
concentration and price,44 federal officials consider whether a merger should be
challenged because the firms compete with respect to research before that rivalry plays
out with actual competing products.45 The agencies have based their Merger Guidelines
on the ―unifying theme‖ that ―mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance
market power or to facilitate its exercise‖ because ―[s]ellers with market power also may
lessen competition on dimensions other than price, such as product quality, service, or
innovation.‖46 In short, the concern that some mergers may reduce innovation influences
merger law.
Like patent policy, antitrust law attempts to strike the proper balance between underand over-enforcement. Overly aggressive antitrust enforcement could chill innovation. In
addition to affirmatively trying to encourage innovation, antitrust policy avoids pursuing
competition in a manner that unnecessarily stifles innovation. This can be seen in
antitrust statutes, guidelines, and cases.
First, antitrust statutes recognize that innovation is often a product of collaboration.
Antitrust law is primarily common law, as courts define what constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade on a case-by-case basis, creating precedent for future courts in the
process. Although statutory amendments are relatively rare, Congress has responded to
the risk that courts could potentially hold some forms of research-related collaboration to
violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Congress enacted the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984—amended by the National Cooperative Research and Production
Act and the Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 200447—in order
to facilitate technical collaboration by eliminating per se treatment and treble damages for
certain agreements.48 Normally, antitrust liability entails automatic treble damages for a
successful private plaintiff, but members of properly registered cooperative research
ventures only pay single damages should their activities be held violative of antitrust
laws. Further, antitrust liability is less likely to attach because their conduct is evaluated
under the rule of reason. 49 These statutes recognize the need for antitrust leniency where
43. Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 252 (2007) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Restraints] (―Microsoft was engaged in suppressing the innovations of others.‖); see also Sony
Elecs., Inc. v. Soundview Techs., Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (D. Conn. 2001) (discussing ―the purported
harm done to the ‗market for innovation‘ by monopsonistic pricing policies‖).
44. U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM‘N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.0 (1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/20.html [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
45. In re Ciba-Geigy Ltd., 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997).
46. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 44, § 0.1 n.6, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/horiz_book/01.html (emphasis added).
47. Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2000 &
Supp. IV 2004).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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collaboration might facilitate innovation.
Second, at various times the DOJ‘s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) have issued guidelines that counsel in favor of significant deference
where antitrust litigation or liability could chill innovation. In 1995, the FTC and the
DOJ‘s Antitrust Division jointly issued Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (Licensing Guidelines).50 The Licensing Guidelines explicitly
recognize innovation as a goal of antitrust policy, and note that antitrust enforcement
must proceed in a manner that does not undercut innovation. Similarly, the agencies‘
Collaborator Guidelines acknowledge that competitor collaborations can ―fund[]
expensive innovation efforts‖ and can ―benefit, or potentially benefit, consumers by
expanding output, reducing price, or enhancing quality, service, or innovation.‖ 51 The
Collaborator Guidelines build on the Merger Guidelines by ―establish[ing] a safety zone
applicable to research and development collaborations whose competitive effects are
analyzed within an innovation market.‖ 52 Through all of these guidelines, the antitrust
agencies signal that they will employ their prosecutorial discretion in a manner so as not
to interfere with or deter innovation-enhancing activities.
Third, much antitrust case law recognizes that overly aggressive antitrust
enforcement could chill innovation by condemning agreements among competitors that—
while facially anticompetitive—are net beneficial because of their pro-innovation effects.
In the context of section 1 of the Sherman Act, courts give weight to innovation
arguments. For example, joint ventures raise antitrust concerns because competitors
exchange information and can use such ventures as a cover for price fixing. While an
imbalanced antitrust regime might preclude joint ventures among competitors outright,
the government essentially does not prosecute research joint ventures. 53 When private
individuals challenge joint ventures, judges examine the big picture and balance the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of such business ventures. This is perhaps best
typified by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI).54 In BMI, a private plaintiff challenged blanket licenses
created by performing rights societies whereby, for one price, licensees got access to all
of the copyrighted works managed by the society. The Court acknowledged that the
blanket licenses literally resembled a form of price fixing, which would make them

50. LICENSING GUIDELINES, supra note 4.
51. FED. TRADE COMM‘N & U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS 1, 8 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
52. Id. at 26; see also id. at 26–27 (―Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Agencies do not challenge a
competitor collaboration on the basis of effects on competition in an innovation market where three or more
independently controlled research efforts in addition to those of the collaboration possess the required
specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to engage in R&D that is a close substitute for the R&D
activity of the collaboration.‖).
53. See Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and
Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 917 (2001) (―Since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,
there has been exactly one federal government challenge to a research joint venture—an example of caution in
interfering with private arrangements to innovate that would be hard to beat.‖) (citing Auto. Mfrs. Ass‘n v.
United States, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd sub. nom., City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S.
248 (1970)).
54. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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appear to be per se illegal. 55 But the Court created an exception to the per se rule where
the challenged agreement was necessary to create a new product. 56 The blanket license in
BMI represented an innovation in the form of a new product that could not exist but for
the cooperation of thousands of copyright owners, who licensed their works to
performing rights societies that aggregated the individual works into a single package.
In the context of section 2 of the Sherman Act, courts have repeatedly held that
monopolies achieved through innovation—and not predatory conduct—are legal. The
Supreme Court has reasoned that the Sherman Act does not condemn monopolies
achieved as ―a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
accident.‖57 The first two categories are essentially species of innovation. More clearly,
the Second Circuit, in Berkey Photo,58 held that because ―a monopolist is permitted, and
indeed encouraged, by § 2 to compete aggressively on the merits, any success that it may
achieve through ‗the process of invention and innovation‘ is clearly tolerated by the
antitrust laws.‖59 Similarly, antitrust does not require monopolists who innovate to aid
their rivals.60 The innovator is entitled to a first-mover advantage—a period in which the
innovator is able to charge a monopoly price and earn monopoly profits—while its
competitors play catch up. The entrance of competitors should bid the price down; in
theory, that window in which the innovator was able to charge a monopoly price was
sufficient to allow the innovator to recoup its investment and earn a little profit to make
the entire gambit worthwhile.
III. PATENT AND ANTITRUST ARE INTERDEPENDENT PARTS OF INNOVATION POLICY
Parts I and II showed how both patent law and antitrust law play a role in innovation
policy. As noted, courts and commentators have recognized that the two areas of law
serve a common goal. But it is not just that patent and antitrust both facilitate innovation
independently of each other. The fields of law are interdependent. On the one hand,
antitrust law needs patent law to maximize innovation. Unrestricted competition creates
insufficient incentives for innovation. Competitive markets without any protection for
intellectual property would be less likely to see profit-maximizing firms investing in
research that could easily be copied and used by competitors without restriction. This is
widely accepted, so I will not belabor the point.
On the other hand, what is not fully appreciated is that patent law also needs
antitrust law in order to maximize innovation. In the same way that overly strong patent
rights can reduce innovation,61 misconduct by patentees in procuring, enforcing, and
using their patents can also be anticompetitive in a manner that stifles innovation. Yet the
patent system is not designed to truly punish—let alone deter—patent abuses. Antitrust
law is better equipped to punish and deter patent misconduct that may prove to reduce
innovation.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 23.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 281 (citations omitted).
Id.
See supra Part I.
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The remainder of Part III will attempt to show that patent law alone cannot solve the
problem of innovation-suppressing activity by patentees, and that antitrust law provides a
necessary tool to rein in those who abuse the patent system or their patent rights. This
Part will proceed by comparing the patent and antitrust responses to various forms of
patentee misconduct. For each type of misconduct, I will attempt to show how the
relevant patent doctrine is insufficient to address the particular problem, and that
supplementing the patent response with the applicable antitrust cause of action will lead
to better results that should ultimately strengthen the patent system and facilitate
innovation.
A. Comparing Patent and Antitrust Responses to Invalid Patents
The presence of invalid patents in the marketplace hampers both competition and
innovation. Patents confer exclusionary rights, namely ―the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States‖ while the patent is in force.62 As a result,
patents constitute barriers to entry, particularly where no non-infringing substitutes exist.
Federal courts recognize that ―[i]t goes without saying that patents have adverse effects
on competition‖63 and that ―[b]y their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion,
and consequently, cripple competition.‖64 This is seen, however, as an acceptable cost of
encouraging and rewarding innovators who disclose their inventions in exchange for
patent protection. While reduced competition may be a reasonable price to pay for valid
patents, invalid patents add little or no value to society. Unfortunately, invalid patents can
have similar anticompetitive effects to valid patents. 65 As a result, invalid patents upset
the balance between encouraging innovation and suppressing competition because we
pay the cost of reduced competition without receiving the benefit of increased
innovation.66
In addition to staving off market entry, invalid patents may deter research and thus
reduce innovation. Litigation fears may induce some firms to ―avoid market or research
activities out of recognition of the vagaries of litigation results and the possibility of
infringement liability.‖67 In addition to the litigation and potential liability costs,
innovative activity may suffer as management attention and resources are diverted to
litigation, instead of research and production. 68 Litigation costs deter innovation because
62. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)–(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
63. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523–24 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(citations omitted).
64. Id.; Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Dawson Chem.
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (―[T]he essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude
others from profiting by the patented invention.‖); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,
1306 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that ―the exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of the patent grant‖).
65. Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV.
101, 115 (2006) [hereinafter Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects].
66. See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 1019
(1999).
67. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 319; Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 117.
68. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 29, at 14, 132 (illustrating the negative impact that litigation costs
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a ―firm looking to invest in innovation will consider the risk that the innovation will
inadvertently expose it to a patent infringement lawsuit.‖ 69 Recognizing these costs,
firms in biotechnology markets sometimes ―avoid infringing questionable patents and
therefore will refrain from entering or continuing with a particular field of research that
such patents appear to cover. Such effects deter market entry and follow-on innovation by
competitors and increase the potential for the holder of a questionable patent to suppress
competition.‖70 The anticompetitive effect is particularly strong for small innovative
firms that ―lack the resources to challenge such patents.‖ 71 As one software programmer
commented, ―‗the ease with which the U.S. Patent Office has been granting patents in the
last few years has already dampened my plans to write software as a primary
business.‘‖72 The innovation-reducing potential of invalid patents is especially high in
industries characterized by cumulative innovation. Because ―improvements on the patent
cannot be practiced without the permission of the patentee,‖73 competitors may avoid
investments to improve upon a patent of suspect validity. 74 At the FTC hearings,
panelists suggested that ―improperly awarded patents may distort firms‘ research choices
and influence them to shun whole areas of R&D activity.‖ 75 This harms consumers by
stifling technological advancement.76
Invalid patents may distort innovation by channeling research efforts into less
productive uses. Some competitors who fear drawing an infringement suit may attempt to
design around the patent in order to create a non-infringing product. While some judges
view this design-around process as a form of innovation, 77 this is often not an effective
use of limited research budgets. In its report on innovation, the FTC noted that ―the
design-around may add little value, merely requiring that competitors ‗work harder to get
to the same place.‘‖78 During the hearings that led to the report, experts in the software
industry ―complained that design-around efforts may prove costly, duplicative, wasteful,
have on innovative development).
69. Id. at 14.
70. FED. TRADE COMM‘N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5–6, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
[hereinafter PROMOTE INNOVATION].
71. Id. at 54.
72. Id.; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 29, at 132 (―Firms in a weak financial position might see
their credit costs soar because of the bankruptcy risk possibly created by patent litigation.‖).
73. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA.
L. REV. 677, 735 (1986).
74. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free-Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1060
(2005).
75. PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 70, ch. 5, at 2.
76. The uncertainty associated with suspect patents may distort innovation incentives in a similar manner
to imprecisely defined patent grants. Professors James Bessen and Michael Meurer have argued that ―[p]oor
notice causes harm because it subjects technology investors to an unavoidable risk of disputes and litigation.
The expected cost of inadvertent infringement imposes a disincentive on technology investors.‖ BESSEN &
MEURER, supra note 29, at 9.
77. State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (―One of the benefits of a
patent system is its so-called ‗negative incentive‘ to ‗design around‘ a competitor's products, even when they
are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.‖); see also WMS Gaming, Inc. v.
Int‘l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that ―patent law encourages competitors to
design or invent around existing patents‖).
78. PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 70, ch. 2, at 22.
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and sometimes technologically impossible.‖79 Research efforts that could go towards
genuine innovation are diverted. In short, innovation suffers from invalid patents. 80
The anticompetitive and innovation-suppressing effects of invalid patents raise the
issue of how the patent and antitrust regimes respond to the problem. Patent provides a
defense. In contrast, antitrust law provides a cause of action. The following discussion
compares these two approaches.
1. The Patent System’s Response to Invalid Patents
The primary weapon against invalid patents in the patent law arsenal is an invalidity
defense whereby infringement defendants can escape liability by proving, with clear and
convincing evidence, that the patent is invalid. 81 Upon the defendant‘s victory, the patent
is no longer enforceable against any alleged infringer. Patent validity can also be
challenged through declaratory judgment actions, reexaminations, and public use
hearings. None of these has proven a particularly effective method of exposing and
extinguishing invalid patents.82
a. Invalidity Defense
Patent law‘s invalidity defense is insufficient to quell the anti-innovation effects of
invalid patents because, even without active enforcement through infringement lawsuits,
the presence of any patent serves as a ―scarecrow‖ that may keep competitors out of a
particular field.83 Patentees initiate and threaten litigation based on suspect patents.84
Litigation costs associated with defending an infringement suit are high: the direct
litigation costs for patent litigation averaged $2 million per side in 2003 where between
$1 million and $25 million was at stake. 85 When the stakes rise above $25 million, the
average cost rises to $4 million per side.86 And that is just the litigation costs; the
potential liability costs can be staggering. Further, if the competitor knows about the
79. Id. ch. 3, at 50; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 29, at 47 (―Other disputes arise because the
set of potentially relevant patents is large, the scope of the claims is vague, and many of the claims might be
invalid. Under these conditions, designing around patents is difficult and clearing the rights can be prohibitively
expensive.‖).
80. Invalid patents also interfere with the patent system‘s ability to encourage innovation by increasing the
number of patents that must be searched and evaluated, and thus making it harder for innovators to determine
whether their inventions are potentially infringing. Professors Bessen and Meurer argued that ―a large number
of invalid patents increases clearance costs, making inadvertent infringement more likely and litigation more
frequent.‖ BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 29, at 161.
81. Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int‘l., Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
82. Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 140–51 (describing each method and reasons for
failure).
83. Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943).
84. PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 70, ch. 1, at 31.
In recent testimony before the House Judiciary Committee‘s Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property, the AIPLA stated that ‗[l]arge and small companies are increasingly
being subjected to litigation (or its threat) on the basis of questionable patents.‘ As noted earlier,
invalid patents that confer market power unnecessarily thwart competition.
Id.
85. AIPLA, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 (2003).
86. Id.
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patent and infringes anyway, the court may consider the infringement willful and award
treble damages and attorneys‘ fees. 87 Even if a competitor believes the patent is invalid,
the costs of being wrong—or having the judge get it wrong—are too high.88 Investigating
patent validity takes time and money. 89 To avoid the risk of infringement liability and the
attendant litigation costs, risk-averse firms may take a license and pay royalties for a
patent that they believe to be invalid.90 At a minimum, invalid patents delay market
entry, as competitors investigate validity, 91 perform cost-benefit analyses, and perhaps
negotiate licenses or litigate. 92 Furthermore, the mere prospect of an infringement lawsuit
can deter venture capitalists from funding an innovative upstart because, as Professor
Rochelle Dreyfuss has argued, ―patents have in terrorem effects: no one wants to invest
in a business that cannot succeed without first winning a lawsuit.‖ 93 In sum, from both
the standpoint of the competitor and its financial backers, entering a market dominated by
a suspect patent may be prohibitively costly. Invalid patents can have these
anticompetitive effects even if the competitor strongly believes that the patent is
invalid.94
Furthermore, an invalidity defense does not compensate those injured by the invalid
patent. Patent law is designed to remedy wrongs committed against patent owners, not
the wrongs against alleged infringers. It does not provide causes of action to those injured
by the misconduct of patentees (unless the alleged infringer has its own patent that it can
sue on). Because the victims of invalid patents are generally consumers and licensees
who have no IP rights, patent law provides them no mechanism to recover monies paid to
the holder of an invalid patent.

87. 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–85 (2000) (―[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found.‖); Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (―Remedy for willful infringement is founded on 35 U.S.C. § 284.‖).
88. Dreyfus, supra note 73, at 755 (―The existence of the patent—and the fear of an infringement action—
may deter some potential rivals from competing with the patentee and his licensees.‖).
89. Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 119–20 (describing the costs of patent investigation);
see also John A. Jeffery, Preserving the Presumption of Patent Validity: An Alternative to Outsourcing the U.S.
Patent Examiner’s Prior Art Search, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 761, 789 (2003) (―Such ‗validity searches‘ are
extremely exhaustive investigations conducted primarily for litigation purposes, span several weeks, and
consider every possible relevant publication—no matter how remote.‖). But see Mark A. Lemley, Rational
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1510 (assuming search costs to be between $8000 and
$10,000).
90. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 338 (1971) (stating that
―prospective [infringers] will often decide that paying royalties under a license or other settlement is preferable
to the costly burden of challenging the patent‖ even if they believe that the patent is invalid); MedImmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing standing to request a declaration that a patent is
invalid), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006).
91. Lemley, supra note 89, at 1502 (―Validity requires a great deal of attention, however. In contrast to the
eighteen hours an examiner will spend on a patent from start to finish, lawyers and technical experts will spend
hundreds and perhaps even thousands of hours searching for and reading prior art, poring over the specification
and prosecution history, and preparing and defending invalidity arguments.‖).
92. Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 122–25.
93. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 270 (2000); see Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 125–27
(noting that startup companies may not receive financing even if a dominant firm‘s patent is invalid).
94. Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 129–39.
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b. Declaratory Judgment Actions
Aside from entering the market, drawing the infringement lawsuit, and asserting an
invalidity defense, a declaratory judgment action is the other major mechanism by which
a non-patentee can challenge patent validity. However, declaratory judgment actions
suffer from two major weaknesses. First, it is very difficult for excluded competitors to
get standing to bring declaratory judgment actions. 95
Second, declaratory judgment actions are plagued by collective action problems
because each individual competitor may have insufficient incentive to initiate the
litigation.96 Because such actions are essentially patent infringement litigation (with the
parties reversed), declaratory judgment actions are extremely expensive and time
consuming.97 If the plaintiff loses, it is out millions of dollars in litigation costs and has
nothing to show for its troubles. If the plaintiff wins, the patent is invalidated, but the
plaintiff is still out the litigation costs, and probably cannot recoup the costs by
competing in a free market in which multiple competitors bid the market price down. The
other competitors can free ride on the declaratory judgment suit, entering the market with
impunity once the challenge succeeds, but without having to bear the costs of invalidating
the patent. As the FTC has recognized, ―[b]ecause the costs of a challenge are borne by
the challenger, but the benefits of invalidation spill over to other potential licensees and
to consumers, the private incentives to launch a challenge are less than would be
warranted by the social return.‖98 This makes initiating a declaratory judgment action a
losing proposition, regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit.
In short, the patent system alone cannot solve the problem of the negative effects
that invalid patents have on innovation.
2. Antitrust’s Response to Invalid Patents
The antitrust approach to invalid patents is fundamentally different than the patent
law approach. Whereas patent creates a defense, antitrust law provides a cause of action
to those who suffer from the anticompetitive effects of invalid patents, provided the other
elements of the alleged antitrust violation are satisfied. This section reviews two potential
antitrust violations that may arise from invalid patents.
a. Sham Patent Infringement Litigation
The threat or initiation of infringement litigation based on an invalid patent injures
both competition and innovation. If a patentee maintains a monopoly (or attempts to) by
enforcing known invalid patents, this can constitute a section 2 violation. If a group of
patentees does so, section 1 is implicated. In either case, antitrust law seeks to protect the
legitimate interests that patent owners have in asserting their IP rights. It does so by
immunizing patentees against antitrust liability, so long as their lawsuit is not a sham.

95. Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 141–42 (2008).
96. Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 148–50.
97. Id.
98. PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 70, ch. 5, at 20; see also Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better
Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 668 (2004) (making the
same point).
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The Supreme Court has articulated a two-element test for sham litigation. In order to
show that a patentee‘s actual or threatened lawsuit is not protected, the antitrust plaintiff
must prove the threshold element that ―the lawsuit . . . [is] objectively baseless in the
sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.‖ 99 Only
if the objective element is established can the plaintiff proceed to the second element,
which is subjective. Here, ―the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit
conceals ‗an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor,‘
through the ‗use [of] the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that
process—as an anticompetitive weapon.‘‖100 If the target of the infringement lawsuit can
prove the elements of the sham exception, as well as the underlying elements of the
antitrust claim, the excluded competitor can receive treble damages for injuries caused by
the patentee‘s misconduct, including lost profits from market exclusion and reasonable
litigation costs.101 Antitrust liability also extends to scenarios in which the patentee holds
a valid patent, but brings an objectively frivolous lawsuit against a non-infringing
competitor with the intent that the litigation will delay or deter market entry. 102
A similar analysis applies to sham litigation predicated on a valid patent, but
alleging frivolous claims of infringement. Simply because an infringement plaintiff‘s
patent is valid does not mean that its lawsuit is not a sham. A patentee may sue a
competitor even when the patentholder knows that the rival‘s product is non-infringing.
In such cases, the patentee hopes that the cost and delay associated with litigation will
blunt the competitive threat posed by the rival. 103 Like infringement litigation premised
on invalid patents, this second form of sham litigation may unnecessarily stifle
innovation. Professor Hovenkamp has explained the innovation-stifling potential when:
a large firm files a patent infringement suit against a much smaller new entrant
with innovative technology. The dominant firm is reasonably sure that the new
entrant‘s technology does not infringe the dominant firm‘s patents, but it also
knows that a nascent rival cannot afford years of infringement litigation,
particularly if it is accompanied by such things as letters warning the small
firm‘s customers that if they use the small firm‘s product they will be infringers
as well.104
Yet despite the fact that pursuing such frivolous infringement litigation can inhibit
the very innovation that the patent system seeks to maximize, patent law has no
mechanism to punish or deter such conduct by patentees. Antitrust law, however, does. If
a patentee maintains monopoly power through such sham litigation, the excluded
competitor can bring an antitrust claim based on illegal monopolization or attempted
monopolization. Antitrust liability, and the prospect of treble damages, can actually deter
patentee misconduct designed to harness the exclusionary power of known invalid or

99. Prof‘l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 50 (1993).
100. Id. at 60–61 (citations omitted).
101. See Handgards v. Ethicon, 601 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 1979).
102. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 255 (noting the potential for patent holders to file infringement suits
―based on a claim that is broader than its patent actually creates‖).
103. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 29, at 133 (discussing how a patentee can lose an infringement
action but still gain from the delay in market entry caused by the litigation).
104. Hovenkamp, Restraints, supra note 43, at 248.
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non-infringed patents. In contrast, patent law does not punish patentees in this scenario.
The patentee may lose the lawsuit, but that result is common and does not penalize the
specific misdeed of filing frivolous infringement lawsuits. Antitrust law provides a more
effective response in this scenario.
b. Agreements That Conceal Invalid Patents
Patentees sometimes try to harness the anticompetitive and innovation-suppressing
effects of patents by illegitimate means, such as through conspiracies to expand the scope
of valid patents, or to insulate invalid patents from judicial scrutiny. For example, in the
Singer case,105 patent holders cross-licensed their patents with mutual promises that they
would not challenge the scope of each others‘ patents in order to keep the ―claims ‗as
broad as possible‘ [which] indicates a desire to secure as broad coverage for the patent as
possible, the more effectively to stifle competition.‖106
The patent system does not forbid such agreements because it is not designed to.
Once the patent issues, it is presumed valid and the patentee is allowed to license or use
its patent in any conceivable way, so long as it does not improperly extend its patent
rights.107 Thus, patent misuse doctrine is generally of no use in these situations because
the patentees are not exercising exclusionary power beyond the scope of their patents.
Antitrust, in contrast, can reach agreements to conceal overly broad or invalid
patents. The conduct of the gypsum conspiracy is instructive:
The case presented the issues sharply. Since 1929, the gypsum companies have
operated under a patent license price-fixing scheme covering their business in
gypsum lath and wall board. Prices, which were in sharp competition prior to
1929, have since been entirely uniform. In fact, prices for gypsum board rose
steadily right through the first several years of the depression. Moreover, of the
five patents whose validity was particularly called in question, none had ever
been challenged in the courts. The industry had covenanted not to test them; it
had agreed not to contest the validity of three, in fact, even before they were
issued by the Patent Office. Nothing, it seems, was left to chance.108
Antitrust can punish such conspiracies, disgorge any ill-gotten gains, and
compensate consumers who paid higher prices as a result of the conspiracy. Patent
law cannot.
Antitrust and patent can also work in tandem on these issues. For example,
following the Singer decision, Congress required that any agreement ―made in connection
with or in contemplation of the termination of the interference‖ proceeding had to be filed
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) before the termination.109 Patent law
105. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
106. Id. at 190 (―This effect was accomplished, for when the Patent Office placed the . . . patents in
interference, [one defendant] abandoned the proceeding, thus facilitating the issuance of broad claims to
[another defendant].‖).
107. See generally In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that antitrust laws are not violated by a manufacturer‘s refusal to sell or license its patented products).
108. Roscoe Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, 56 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1946). (discussing United
States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 53 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1943)).
109. 35 U.S.C.A. § 135(c) (West 2001).
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has some teeth here, because failure to file renders the patents at issue unenforceable.110
But antitrust law can ratchet up the effectiveness of this provision by making the actual
settlements illegal and punishable by monetary penalties. This additional disincentive is
important because if the parties know that the evidence exposed during the interference
proceeding would render both of the patents invalid—or the surviving patent so limited in
scope as to be economically worthless—unenforceability is an insufficient deterrent.
Because antitrust provides a more meaningful penalty if patent applicants are attempting
to conceal invalid patents, antitrust can do a better job of ridding the marketplace of
invalid patents than patent law. At a minimum, antitrust law must be maintained as one of
the weapons necessary to perform this task.
B. Inequitable Conduct Versus a Walker Process Claim
One particular species of invalid patent is a patent procured by deceiving the patent
examiner. Like other invalid patents, these patents reduce competition and innovation
without a countervailing benefit. Patent law and antitrust law each have a legal doctrine
to address the problem of patent applicants engaging in deceptive conduct before the
PTO. Patent law has the doctrine of inequitable conduct. This operates essentially as a
defense in an infringement lawsuit, as the ―patent may be rendered unenforceable for
inequitable conduct if an applicant, with intent to mislead or deceive the examiner, fails
to disclose material information or submits materially false information to the PTO
during prosecution.‖111 The infringement defendant arguing that a patent is
unenforceable due to the patentee‘s inequitable conduct must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the applicant met ―thresholds of both materiality and intent.‖ 112
If the claim is successful, the defendant is liable for infringement.
The antitrust corollary is a cause of action for illegal monopolization based on the
Supreme Court case of Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.113 In Walker Process, the Court held that ―the enforcement of a patent procured by
fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act provided the other
elements necessary to a § 2 case are present.‖114 If a competitor can prove that the
patentee acquired or maintained a monopoly through patent fraud—and that the
competitor suffered antitrust injury as a result—then it can recover treble damages for its
injuries.
The Federal Circuit‘s recent decision in Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey115 illustrates the
difference between patent and antitrust responses to patentee misconduct, and how those
differences affect consumers, competition, and innovation policy. In Dippin’ Dots, the
patentee brought suit against a competitor for infringing a patent on ―a process for
making a form of cryogenically prepared novelty ice cream product.‖ 116 The alleged
infringer argued that the patent was invalid for obviousness, and unenforceable due to the

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Molins PLC v. Textron, 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Walker Process Equip. Corp. v. Food Mach. & Chem Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
Id. at 174.
Dippin‘ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1340. The infringement plaintiffs included both the inventor and his exclusive licensee. Id.
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patentee‘s inequitable conduct during prosecution. 117 The defendant also brought an
antitrust counterclaim based on Walker Process.118
The same event provided the basis for both the inequitable conduct defense and the
Walker Process counterclaim, namely, that the patentee had sold 800 units of the product
at a public festival more than a year before filing its patent application. 119 If true, no
patent should have issued due to the on-sale bar, which requires an inventor to file a
patent application within one year of the first sale or offer for sale of the product claimed
in the application.120 The patentee did not dispute that it had failed to disclose the prior
sales.121 The competitor alleged that the patentee‘s concealment constituted both
inequitable conduct and fraud. The jury found for the infringement defendant on both of
its defenses, as well as its antitrust counterclaim.122
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that ―[t]he first prong of the inequitable conduct
test, materiality, is clearly met here.‖123 The Circuit, however, believed that the evidence
of intent to deceive was weaker, but held that ―the district court was permitted to balance
the relatively weak evidence of intent together with the strong evidence that DDI‘s
omission was highly material to the issuance of the ′156 patent and to find that on
balance, inequitable conduct had occurred.‖124 The court found no abuse of discretion by
the district court, and affirmed the finding of inequitable conduct, rendering the patent
unenforceable.125
The Federal Circuit, however, was far more reticent to allow a role for antitrust law
in the litigation. The court began by noting that a ―finding of inequitable conduct does not
by itself suffice to support a finding of Walker Process fraud, because ‗inequitable
conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to
support a Walker Process counterclaim.‘‖126 The Federal Circuit held that Walker
Process fraud should be more difficult to prove in two ways. First, ―[t]o demonstrate
Walker Process fraud, a claimant must make higher threshold showings of both
materiality and intent than are required to show inequitable conduct.‖ 127 Second, unlike
the inequitable conduct defense, no balancing between scienter and materiality is
permitted, and thus ―a strong showing of one cannot make up for a deficiency in the
other.‖128
The Federal Circuit held that the antitrust plaintiffs failed to satisfy this test. The

117. Id. at 1342.
118. Id.
119. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340–41.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
121. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340.
122. Id. at 1341 (―The jury also found that both Jones and Schickli had, with intent to deceive, made
material misrepresentations or omissions in violation of the duty of candor to the PTO. It also determined that
defendants Mini Melts, Inc. and Frosty Bites Distribution had proven all required elements of their antitrust
counterclaim, including the requisite fraud on the PTO.‖).
123. Id. at 1345.
124. Id. at 1346.
125. Id. at 1339.
126. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovating, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059,
1069 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
127. Id. at 1346 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 1348 (citing Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071).
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court found that materiality was established ―since the evidence supports a finding that
the patent would not have issued if DDI had disclosed the [prior] sales to the PTO.‖129
The court, however, declared that the antitrust plaintiffs could not prove scienter based on
the patent applicant‘s omission of the prior sales.130 This, despite the fact that the 800
prior sales, at an event more than one year before the patent application was filed, were
made directly by the inventor—and patent applicant—himself.131 The court focused on
the fact that the misconduct was an omission and that it was too difficult to read
fraudulent intent into an omission.132 The Federal Circuit held that the patentee had
engaged in inequitable conduct, but not fraud. 133 The court‘s ruling meant that the
patentee‘s misconduct would be subject to those remedies available under patent law, but
not to antitrust sanctions.
The Federal Circuit‘s conception of fraud substantially undermines efforts to deter
misconduct by patent applicants. Absent the extremely rare scenario in which the patent
applicant includes a reference to the patent-invalidating fact in a draft application, and
then subsequently removes the reference before the application is filed with the PTO, the
Federal Circuit fails to clearly explain when an omission may constitute fraud. The
Federal Circuit‘s failure is critical because patent fraud is often committed by omission:
the applicant failing to include references to relevant prior art and to sales before the
critical date.134
The Federal Circuit sees a fundamental distinction between patent and antitrust
policies in response to applicant misconduct. The court acknowledged that the
―difference in breadth between inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud admits the
possibility of a close case whose facts reach the level of inequitable conduct, but not of
fraud before the PTO.‖135 The court endorsed this asymmetry because a Walker Process
claim is ―a sword‖ whereas the inequitable conduct defense is ―a mere ‗shield.‘‖ 136 The
court failed to recognize that when taking on evildoers, a knight needs both.
Because the Federal Circuit wanted to rely solely on patent law, and to deny a more
meaningful role for antitrust in cases of applicant misconduct, the court comes
dangerously close to immunizing from antitrust liability a patent applicant‘s
misrepresentations about when its first sale occurred. The court had earlier acknowledged
the difficulty of patent examiners discovering this information on their own:
Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to disclose sales that
bear all the earmarks of commercialization reasonably supports an inference
that the inventor‘s attorney intended to mislead the PTO. The concealment of
sales information can be particularly egregious because, unlike the applicant‘s
failure to disclose, for example, a material patent reference, the examiner has
no way of securing the information on his own. 137
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1340.
Id. at 1347–48.
Id. at 1348–49.
See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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The Dippin’ Dots court reiterated ―that omission of sales made before the critical date is
especially problematic‖138 because the court must divine the intent of a failure to act.
Perhaps the Federal Circuit could solve its problem by framing the issue differently: the
applicant knew when it first sold the product and, when asked the date of the first sale, it
provided a later date. This is essentially a misrepresentation: instead of giving the correct
earlier date, the applicant provides a later (false) date. Although the patent applicant may
later argue that a sale did not constitute a ―sale‖ for patent application purposes, this is an
issue for the patent examiner to decide. Furthermore, such an argument is particularly
unpersuasive in a case, like Dippin’ Dots, where the court held that the earlier sales were
clearly material.
The Federal Circuit‘s decision in Dippin’ Dots to eschew antitrust rules shows the
inadequacy of relying solely on patent doctrines to address the problems associated with
applicant misconduct. The competitor‘s successful inequitable conduct defense meant
that it was not liable for infringement. That is the correct result on the infringement
claim, but it is hardly sufficient to right the wrong that the patentee has committed. The
competitors should never have been sued for infringement in the first place—and should
never have had to worry about an infringement suit when deciding to enter the market—
because no patent should have issued. The unenforceable patent necessarily
complicated—and probably delayed—market entry. Furthermore, the competitors had to
endure the cost, diversion of resources, and distraction of defending themselves against a
lawsuit that should have never been brought. 139 After the Dippin’ Dots decision came
down, competitors who stayed out of the market for fear of drawing an infringement
lawsuit could now safely enter the market. But those competitors that had previously
been excluded from the market did not have a cause of action for lost profits: Patent law
creates no affirmative rights for non-patentees injured by invalid or unenforceable
patents.
In addition to the competitors, consumers also suffer damages caused by applicant
misdeeds. For example, in Walker Process, even though its patent was invalid, FMC was
able to use it to deter market entry for almost the entire life of the patent. 140 Yet once the
patent expired, the market price fell from $150 per unit to $50. 141 Because of the patent
fraud, the patentee was able to charge consumers three times the market price.
Consumers who paid supracompetitive prices—designed to reward inventors with valid
patents—would not be able to recover for the overcharge because inequitable conduct
does nothing to compensate victims of the patentee‘s deception.142 In sum, if consumers
138. Dippin’ Dots, 476 F.3d at 1345.
139. Arguably, the competitors could attempt to recover their legal fees in another antitrust suit premised
not on Walker Process, but on PREI.
140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (No. 602), reprinted in 17 ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1955 TERM–1975 TERM 737 (Philip B. Kurland
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1979).
141. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172 (1965) (No. 13), reprinted in 17 ANTITRUST LAW: MAJOR BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1955 TERM–1975 TERM 784 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper,
eds., 1979) (noting the rebuttal argument of Charles J. Merriam on behalf of the petitioner) [hereinafter Walker
Process transcript].
142. Licensees who paid royalties on an unenforceable patent would not be able to get their money back.
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and competitors can only look to the patent system for relief, they will not be
compensated for their injuries caused by the patentee‘s misconduct.
In contrast, an antitrust response to Dippin‘ Dots‘ wrongdoing would look
fundamentally different. The excluded competitors would be able to sue for treble
damages caused by the illegal monopolization. In some jurisdictions, the consumers who
paid the monopoly overcharge to Dippin‘ Dots would be able to recover treble damages
for the overcharge.143 These damages awarded to private antitrust plaintiffs would
disgorge the ill-gotten gains associated with the misconduct and would compensate those
injured by it. Further, any resulting publicity would strengthen deterrence against patent
applicant misconduct moving forward.
Finally, the reliance on patent law to the exclusion of antitrust remedies risks
making applicant misconduct cost-beneficial. The facts of Walker Process itself also
show why antitrust law is a better vehicle to punish and deter patent fraud, and to remedy
the anticompetitive and anti-innovative effects of patent fraud. The patent applicant,
FMC, concealed a sale of the product at issue that occurred before the critical date—the
precise conduct at issue in Dippin’ Dots. Despite industry rumors that FMC‘s patents
were invalid, would-be competitors declined to enter the market out of fear of drawing an
infringement suit.144 When Walker Process finally entered the market, FMC sued even
though less than one year remained until the patent expired.145 Although Walker Process
did argue an inequitable conduct defense, this alone would have been inadequate to right
FMC‘s wrong. FMC had already charged the monopoly price for the life of the patent;
rendering the patent unenforceable would have been meaningless because the patent
expired before the litigation finished. Patent law could not disgorge the ill-gotten gains,
but antitrust law could. Even if a patent is invalidated, it would not disgorge the ill-gotten
gains from the patent‘s effective exclusion of competitors. This failure to disgorge makes
the misconduct profitable. Antitrust disgorges and deters, patent law does not. As a result,
antitrust law and remedies can enhance the integrity of the patent system by deterring
misconduct, including misconduct that reduces innovation.
Patent scholars may be concerned that increasing the role of antitrust law as a
remedy for misbehavior by patentees could create a disincentive to engage in research
and other patentable activity. One fear is that with greater use of antitrust sanctions,
patentees who make honest mistakes will be punished and the inventors‘ apprehension
about the possibility of treble damages could discourage innovation. 146 This risk,
however, is largely mitigated by the fact that, like inequitable conduct, a Walker Process
fraud claim requires the antitrust plaintiff to prove an intent to deceive the PTO.
Patent scholars may argue that the sanctions contained within patent law are
sufficient to punish and deter patent applicants from deceiving the PTO. From a
patentee‘s perspective, the legal ramifications of inequitable conduct are sweeping: the
entire patent is rendered unenforceable, even those patent claims that are not the root of
143. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Role of Consumers in Walker Process Litigation, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE
AM. 281, 288–98 (2007) [hereinafter Leslie, Role of Consumers].
144. See Walker Process transcript, supra note 140, at 2–3 (noting that FMC faced ―practically no
competition‖ and was only ―able to find one single instance of infringement up to the time after the patent had
expired‖).
145. Id. at 3 (statement of Charles J. Merriam on behalf of petitioner).
146. This concern was expressed by participants at the conference for this symposium.
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the inequitable conduct.147 This may seem punitive, or at least sufficiently far-reaching,
to deter deception. In some circumstances, however, this patent remedy may be
inadequate to ensure candor. First, some inequitable conduct permeates the entire patent
and not merely individual claims. For example, it is unclear whether the concealed sales
in Dippin’ Dots, if known by the patent examiner, would have led the PTO to reject all—
or merely some—of the claims in the tainted application. If the misconduct infects all of
the claims, then it is proper that the entire patent be unenforceable. Indeed, when
awareness of the material omission or misrepresentation renders the claims invalid, the
patent is unenforceable, regardless of the inequitable conduct doctrine.
Second, the claims that are not directly the target of the inequitable conduct may not
be particularly valuable. Suppose that a patent applicant has five claims in its application.
The applicant conceals material information with respect to Claim 1, with the intent of
deceiving the patent examiner. If known, the omitted information would lead the
examiner to reject Claim 1, but not Claims 2 through 5, whose validity is unaffected by
the concealed information. Because the exposure of the misconduct renders the entire
patent unenforceable, the rational applicant would not commit inequitable conduct with
respect to Claim 1, unless Claim 1 were considerably more valuable than the remaining
claims.148 Otherwise, the applicant would not risk endangering Claims 2 through 5 by
committing inequitable conduct with respect to Claim 1. The fact that the applicant
attaches the valid claims to the invalid claim, and thereby puts the valid claims at risk,
suggests that the valid claims had a significantly lower expected value than the claim for
which the applicant committed inequitable conduct.149
More importantly, perhaps, focusing solely on the possibility of honest omissions
distracts us from the core question of what should happen in cases in which a patentee
uses misconduct to acquire a patent that it should not have, and then charges consumers a
monopoly price for the patented product. Who is entitled to that overcharge? Should the
patentee be able to keep the profits associated with a patent that it should have never
received?150 Or should the consumers who paid the overcharge get it back? If consumers
should be reimbursed for the illegal overcharge, then an antitrust remedy is necessary
because patent law does not compensate non-patentees for injuries inflicted by patent
holders.151
147. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see generally
Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J.
(forthcoming 2009).
148. Alternatively, the applicant could be extremely confident that it would not get caught.
149. Theoretically, at least, if Claims 2 through 5 in our example were, in fact, relatively valuable and
would issue absent the applicant‘s inequitable conduct, the applicant could separate out the valid claims into a
separate application untainted by inequitable conduct.
150. This Article addresses only inequitable conduct where the patent should not have issued but for the
inequitable conduct. In other words, if the patent is otherwise valid, then antitrust liability should not attach
through a Walker Process claim.
151. Some observers may be worried that antitrust‘s treble damages may represent overkill and cause
overdeterrence. Such concerns, however, are mitigated by the fact that antitrust recoveries generally
approximate single damages, Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 173 (1993), and, in particular, in the case of antitrust class actions (which consumer suits
would primarily be) almost all cases settle at considerably less than single damages. Christopher R. Leslie, De
Facto Detrebling: The Rush to Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1035–36
(2008).
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In sum, to the extent that invalid and improperly procured patents stifle innovation,
the exclusive use of patent law to address applicant misconduct constitutes inefficient
innovation policy. Supplementing patent law with antitrust remedies provides a more
effective legal response to the problem of invalid patents.
C. Patent Misuse Versus a Tying Claim
In addition to misconduct during the patent application process, patentees sometimes
exploit their patents in ways that impermissibly extend the patents‘ exclusionary effects.
Patent law addresses this problem through the patent misuse doctrine. Patent misuse
occurs when the patentee has ―impermissibly broadened the ‗physical or temporal scope‘
of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.‖ 152 Patent misuse is a defense to an
infringement claim, not a cause of action. If the defendant can prove that the patentee
misused its patent, the patent is rendered unenforceable. 153 Patent misuse can take
several different forms. The most commonly discussed example is ―using a patent which
enjoys market power in the relevant market . . . to restrain competition in an unpatented
product or employing the patent beyond its . . . term.‖154
The first form of patent misuse maps to the antitrust claim of tying. A tying
arrangement exists whenever a seller refuses to sell one product that the consumer wants
to purchase (the ―tying product‖) unless the consumer agrees to also purchase another
separate product (the ―tied product‖). Tying implicates patent misuse when the tying
product is patented. Tying arrangements can have anticompetitive effects in the tied
product market if the tying seller uses its market power in the tying product market to
secure market power in the tied product market. 155 Because tying is an antitrust cause of
action, successful plaintiffs can recover treble damages. Tying claims may be brought by
consumers who paid an overcharge because of the tie-in, or by competitors who were
excluded from the market by the tying arrangement and lost profits as a result.
In addition to their effects on price, tying arrangements may also reduce innovation
in the tied product market. Because the tying seller‘s version of the tied product does not
have to compete on the merits, that seller does not need to innovate its product to gain
sales. Furthermore, competitors in the tied product market may have less incentive to
develop a better version of the tied product if consumers are contractually precluded from
buying it. This is also illustrated in cases of technological tying. For example, in C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Systems Inc.,156 Bard made patented ―guns‖ that fired biopsy needles.157
Because its competitors‘ non-infringing replacement needles could have been used with
the gun, Bard redesigned the gun so that only Bard‘s replacement needles worked. 158
This had two effects. The immediate effect was to exclude other suppliers of replacement
needles from the market. The secondary effect was to suppress innovation. Bard
152. Windsurfing Int‘l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
153. B. Braun Med. Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that ―patent misuse
simply renders the patent unenforceable‖).
154. Id. at 1426 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (1994)).
155. See Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor: A Simple Explanation
of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 812 (2004).
156. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys. Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
157. Id. at 1346.
158. Id. at 1382 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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essentially imposed a technological tie-in because, in order to use the biopsy gun that
they desired (the tying product), buyers had to purchase the replacement needles (the tied
product) from Bard as well. The tying arrangement reduced the incentive to make
innovative needles because the improved needles could not be used with a patented
biopsy gun that was configured—and could be repeatedly reconfigured—to be
incompatible with other needles. In general, if the patentee can change the design of the
patented product at will in order to render the improved product incompatible and thus
worthless to consumers, the incentive to improve the tied product is minimized and
innovation will suffer.159 Interoperability may increase competition within systems and,
therefore, increase innovation. It is for precisely these reasons that monopolists eschew
interoperability.160
Although both patent law and antitrust law condemn tying arrangements where the
tying product is patented, the tying seller has market power, and there is an
anticompetitive effect, the two bodies of law approach the problem in different ways.
Patent law creates a defense, while antitrust makes the conduct an offense. Arguably,
both are necessary.
The patent misuse doctrine alone is an inadequate response to anticompetitive tying
arrangements. Patent misuse is only a defense, not a cause of action, and the targets and
victims of such misuse do not have any affirmative claim for damages under patent
law.161 Consequently, patent misuse can neither disgorge ill-gotten gains (and thus deter
misuse by making it unprofitable), nor provide compensation to those who suffered from
the anticompetitive effect created outside the scope of the patent. Furthermore, the patent
misuse doctrine allows a patentee to retain and enforce its patent so long as the
anticompetitive conduct is stopped. While courts have not spoken with a single voice on
the matter, some have held that ―if the unlawful practice has been abandoned and the
consequences of the improper exploitation have been dissipated, the misuse is considered
‗purged,‘ and the owner‘s right to enforce the patent revives.‖ 162 This imposes a
temporary cost, because the patentee cannot recover against infringers during the period
in which the misuse occurred. It remains possible that, depending on the amount of
infringement damages sacrificed, the amount of money gained by tying may outweigh the
expected losses. If so, patent misuse doctrine may insufficiently deter anticompetitive
moves that may hurt innovation.
Antitrust takes a different approach in dealing with tying arrangements. Instead of
providing a defense and simply removing the patentee‘s ability to collect damages,
antitrust allows the targets and victims of tying arrangements to collect damages from the
patentee. In this way, consumers and competitors who suffer antitrust injury as a result of
159. The inventor of the biopsy gun deserves a return on its investment; patent law provides this by creating
a meaningful barrier to entry—the patentee can raise the price of the biopsy gun as high as the market will bear,
and infringing products cannot enter the market and bid the price down to its competitive level. But the patent
provides no barrier to entry into the complementary product market for unpatented needles.
160. For example, Microsoft tried to interfere with Java because it would have created interoperability.
161. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―[T]he defense of patent
misuse may not be converted to an affirmative claim for damages simply by restyling it as a declaratory
judgment counterclaim.‖).
162. Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 446 F. Supp. 1056, 1068 (D. Neb. 1978) (citing Morton Salt
Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.,
562 F.2d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1977)).
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the tie-in are compensated. Furthermore, because damages are trebled, the antitrust
approach is more likely to disgorge any ill-gotten gains earned through the tie-in. Finally,
the successful plaintiff in an antitrust suit will receive its attorneys‘ fees and reasonable
costs.163 Even if the infringement defendant prevails on its patent misuse defense, it will
ordinarily be responsible for its own litigation costs. Thus, even if the defendant wins on
a patent claim, it is worse off than if the misuse had never occurred.
On some level, the relationship between patent misuse and antitrust law remains
unclear. Some courts describe the patent misuse doctrine as ―a method of limiting abuse
of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws.‖ 164 Others describe them as
coextensive.165
Antitrust is what gives teeth to the patent misuse doctrine. In those instances when
patent misuse does not rise to the level of an antitrust violation, the patent becomes
unenforceable, but no damages attach for any injuries caused by the misuse. But this
raises the question: if the patentee has misused in a manner that is unenforceable, why
should those firms and individuals who suffered injury caused by the misuse not have a
right to compensation? Patent law does not provide one; antitrust law does.
D. Summary
Absent effective antitrust enforcement, several forms of patent abuse might be
viewed as cost-beneficial. These include enforcing invalid patents, bringing frivolous
litigation against non-infringing competitors, entering into anticompetitive crosslicensing agreements, committing patent fraud, engaging in tying (contractual or
technological), and exercising patent rights in a manner beyond the scope of the patent.
All of these patent abuses undermine innovation. Patent law, however, cannot respond
adequately to these forms of misconduct because it is not fundamentally designed to
police and punish patent holders; rather, it focuses primarily on policing and punishing
infringers.
Because patent holders may engage in conduct that improperly suppresses
innovation, and patent law does not sufficiently constrain such behavior, decision makers
who care about innovation should move toward antitrust. All of the above misdeeds
inflict traditional antitrust injury—higher prices, reduced output, and the illegitimate
exclusion of efficient competitors—as well as harm to innovation, which antitrust cares
about as well. Effective antitrust enforcement need not interfere with patent policy; it
reinforces the goals of the patent system.
IV. STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE BETWEEN PATENT AND ANTITRUST
Patent law does not exist in a vacuum. It is but one component of a country‘s overall
innovation policy. Other elements include government contracts for, and subsidization of,
both basic and industry-specific research.166 Antitrust law, too, should be considered a

163. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
164. B. Braun Med., Inc., 124 F.3d at 1426.
165. Windsurfing Int‘l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
166. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 29, at 217 (discussing governmental contracts for industrial
research).
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major component of national innovation policy. Patent law alone cannot police those
abuses of the patent system that inflict harm on the competitive marketplace and suppress
innovation. Antitrust law must play a part.
As part of an overall policy to maximize innovation, the legal system must
effectively respond to misconduct by patentees that stifles innovation. This, in turn,
requires the achievement of several related goals. A functional legal regime must: 1) stop
on-going misconduct and its effects; 2) disgorge the ill-gotten gains received through the
misconduct; 3) deter the misconduct in the future; and 4) compensate the victims of the
misconduct.
The current patent system enjoys only mixed success. Patent law is structured to
achieve the first goal. Through its doctrines of inequitable conduct and patent misuse,
patent law renders some patents unenforceable. This effectively alleviates the problem
moving forward. In most instances, patent law stops misconduct more easily than an
antitrust approach can, because an antitrust claim requires the plaintiff to prove the
components of the patent defenses as well as the elements of the antitrust cause of action,
such as monopoly power for section 2 monopolization claims or specific intent to
monopolize for attempted monopolization claims. The patent system, however, does not
succeed in achieving the remaining three goals. It is not designed to disgorge, deter, and
compensate.
For the forms of patent misconduct discussed in Part III, employing an antitrust
remedy strengthens the patent system‘s response and helps to achieve the remaining
goals. The Federal Circuit in Dippin’ Dots likened patent law‘s inequitable conduct
doctrine to a shield and antitrust law‘s Walker Process doctrine to a sword. The court
seemed to think that applying these labels showed, ipso facto, that antitrust remedies
were unnecessary. But the court misconstrued the significance of its own analogy. A
shield can stop an attack, but it cannot disgorge ill-gotten gains, deter future attacks, or
compensate the victims of earlier attacks. Only a sword—an offensive weapon—can
achieve these additional goals. In employing its analogy, the Federal Circuit failed to
recognize that shields and swords are complements, not substitutes. Every well-prepared
knight has both. So it is with innovation policy: patent and antitrust provide
complementary responses to patent misconduct that threatens innovation. Those who take
on perpetrators of patent misconduct need both the shield (patent law) and the sword
(antitrust law).
Because both patent law and antitrust law have comparative advantages in
combating certain types of patent misconduct, they should work more in tandem. The
conventional wisdom holds that patent law and antitrust law operate very differently:
Patent law encourages innovation by granting exclusionary rights to innovators, whereas
antitrust law facilitates innovation by encouraging competitors to innovate to take sales
away from competitors in a free market. But in some contexts, patent law and antitrust
law both encourage innovation by condemning the same innovation-stifling misconduct.
The problem is that patent judges rely solely on patent approaches and fail to recognize
that including an antitrust response as well would be more effective. Instead of patent law
looking at antitrust law as the enemy or an intrusion or imposition, patent law should
recognize that antitrust law is necessary for the patent system to maximize innovation.
Antitrust and patent should be working together against their common enemies:
invalidity, fraud, and tying. The obsession that some courts and commentators have with
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the tension between patent and antitrust has meant that antitrust is disregarded even when
an antitrust approach helps the short-term and long-term patent goals of responding to
misconduct and encouraging innovation, respectively.
Some observers may worry that antitrust is too blunt a weapon to address the
problems associated with patent misconduct, which should be resolved by patent law
alone. Many decisions of the Federal Circuit certainly reflect this view. 167 A historical
basis exists for pessimism about the need for antitrust restraint. The antitrust policies of
the past were at times inappropriately aggressive and federal judges often favored
antitrust plaintiffs over patent owners. 168 By the early 1970s, antitrust‘s domination over
patents was enshrined in the DOJ‘s Antitrust Division policy known as the ―Nine NoNo‘s.‖169 The Division‘s view was that antitrust law should condemn a wide array of
licensing provisions used by patent owners, including grantback provisions, tying,
restrictions on the resale of patented products, mandatory package licensing, and
restrictions on a licensee‘s use of a product made pursuant to a patented process.170
While some of these activities sometimes had anticompetitive consequences, others most
often probably did not. The era of the Nine No-No‘s has passed during the Reagan
Administration.171 These past antitrust philosophies have long since been repudiated.
If an imbalance exists today between antitrust law and patent law, it favors the
latter.172 Antitrust decision-makers seem to do a relatively good job of considering the
effects of antitrust opinions on the patent system. 173 Antitrust courts reduce the reach of
antitrust law in deference to the patent system. For example, some courts deny standing
to consumers in Walker Process cases because they do not want to dampen the incentive
for firms to engage in patentable activity. 174 But these holdings defer to patent holders at
the expense of disgorging the ill-gotten gains from—and compensating the victims of—
illegal monopolies based on fraudulently procured patents. 175 Similarly, antitrust courts
167. See, e.g., Dippin‘ Dots v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reversing the antitrust
counterclaims).
168. Thomas Austern, Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1015, 1015 (1965) (―[T]here has been an accelerating abrasion, an enormous erosion, and a constant
curtailment of what was formerly thought to be lawful conduct in the exploitation of a patent. In the judicial
cold war between patent exploitation and basic antitrust policy, antitrust has usually prevailed.‖).
169. Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to
Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167, 178 (1997).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 178 n.67.
172. See generally Steve Seidenberg, Reinventing Patent Law, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008, at 59, 60, available at
http:/abajournal.com/magazine/reinventing_patent_law/ (―‗There‘s a widespread perception that a lot of abuses
are happening, a lot of innovation is being stifled rather than helped‘ by a system that heavily favors patent
holders, says James J. Foster, a patent litigator at Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks in Boston.‖).
173. See ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION
AND COMPETITION, supra note 4, at 2 (―The Agencies must apply antitrust principles to identify illegal
collusive or exclusionary conduct while at the same time supporting the incentives to innovate created by
intellectual property rights. Condemning efficient activity involving intellectual property rights could
undermine that incentive to innovate.‖).
174. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96201, at *15–22
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 541
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., 335 F. Supp. 2d 522, 529 (D.N.J. 2004) (denying plaintiffs
standing under reasoning of Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys Inc., 591 F. Supp. 608 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)).
175. See Leslie, Role of Consumers, supra note 143 at 289 (discussing current recovery limitations when
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have also assumed patent validity in a manner that insulates anticompetitive agreements
from antitrust scrutiny.176 While patents are presumed to be valid,177 a presumption that
works in the context of a patent infringement suit may not seamlessly apply in antitrust
litigation. It is inappropriate to expand automatically into the antitrust realm without
considering the consequences of the presumption on the goals of antitrust law. The
emasculation of antitrust law ultimately does not serve the long-term interests of
maximizing innovation.
We need to change the mindset that antitrust is inherently antagonistic to patent law.
A well-functioning patent system is a critical component of a national innovation
strategy. Judges, however, sometimes go one step too far by conflating patents and
innovation as if they are one and the same, instead of appreciating that patents are but one
aspect of innovation policy. Judges should recognize that their goal should be to
maximize innovation, not just patent rights, and that innovation cannot be maximized
without taking antitrust principles into account. A strong antitrust system is an important
component of a larger innovation policy because it provides a check on those forms of
patent misconduct that also injure competition. Much of the conduct that antitrust law
condemns in the context of patents—such as fraud and tying—is conduct that patent law
itself often seeks to stop. The presence of a patent should not unnecessarily lead courts to
defer to the antitrust defendant. In many instances, the presence of the patent is largely
irrelevant to the larger antitrust issue. For example, the Federal Circuit has shown itself
extremely wary to find Walker Process liability lest patent holders be deterred from
innovating. But, as Professor Hovenkamp has explained:
[t]he ―intellectual property‖ content of Walker Process claims is easily
exaggerated. The basis of the claim is that the antitrust defendant went to court
or threatened to do so on a nonmeritorious claim. It in fact knew or should have
known that the patent was invalid or unenforceable. These facts do not
distinguish IP infringement suits from any of a variety of abusive litigation
techniques that can keep rivals out of a market or raise their costs. For example,
one firm in a market might file a frivolous objection before a court or
regulatory agency in order to hold up a rival‘s license. Or one hospital may
supply false information in a proceeding, objecting to a new entrant‘s request
for a Certificate of Need, which the law requires before it can begin
construction.178
Despite the fact that Walker Process claims are simply one species of sham
litigation providing the basis for potential antitrust liability, courts are more deferential
because of the presence of a patent. This is particularly odd because advocates of strong
patent rights should embrace certain antitrust actions like Walker Process claims because
patent fraud undermines the patent regime, 179 and ―[r]ecognizing Walker Process claims
does not create any conflict with IP rights, because the entire basis of the claim is that the
successfully suing the monopolist with a fraudulently procured patent).
176. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 217 (2d Cir. 2006).
177. Scholars have challenged the wisdom of this presumption. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Mark A.
Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007).
178. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 267.
179. Leslie, Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 65, at 139–40.
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IP ‗right‘ being asserted does not exist or is unenforceable.‖180 As a result, the sometimes
visceral response against finding patentees liable for antitrust violations weakens both
antitrust law and the patent system.
Changing the conception of the relationship between antitrust and patent law would
help alleviate the problem. Both antitrust and patent law seek to maximize innovation.
Interpreting patent law and the rights of patent owners in a manner that eviscerates
antitrust law undercuts the very goal that patent-deferential judges want to achieve:
innovation. If these judges saw antitrust law as part of innovation policy, it would
perhaps lead to more appropriate results in antitrust cases—outcomes that would be
beneficial to both the patent system and our overall innovation policy.
V. CONCLUSION
Patent scholars recognize that if patent rights were overly expansive, or patent
durations were excessively long, then patents could weaken innovation by unnecessarily
shrinking the public domain and deterring innovative activity by others. This Article
expands on this wisdom, illustrating a variety of ways in which patent owners may
exercise their IP rights in a manner that both chills innovation and exceeds the scope of
their legitimate patent rights. These include enforcing fraudulently procured patents and
other forms of sham infringement litigation, agreements to conceal invalid patents, and
tying arrangements. Most of these forms of misconduct violate patent principles and, in
some cases, may render the patent unenforceable.
These patent transgressions, however, also implicate antitrust law when they are
employed to maintain an illegal monopoly, or done pursuant to an anticompetitive
conspiracy. Too many judges appear to assume that patent problems should be addressed
solely through patent law. This is a mistake. Analyzing these problems through an
antitrust lens provides a more effective response to patent misconduct that stifles
innovation.

180. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 268.

